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I. Introduction
In the past the function of the international telecommunications
network was limited to the provision of international telephone, tele-
graph, and telex services. The convergence of computer and tele-
communication technology dramatically broadened this function to
the provision of all kinds of datacommunication services, such as
electronic banking and database services. At the same time, the
traditional telecommunication providers' are confronted with the
rise of a whole class of new service providers,2 some of whom have
even established their own private networks. 3 We are living in a
transitional period in which the use of analogue techniques 4 of trans-
I Traditional telecommunication providers (often called "common carriers") histor-
ically have had responsibility for telephone, telegraph, and telex. They include, for exam-
ple, AT&T and Western Union in the United States, N'I injapan, and British Telecom in
the United Kingdom. Many of these providers were previously government agencies or
public utilities, but have been privatized and forced to compete with the new service prov-
iders. Lucky, Common-Carrier Data Cominnication, in COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NET-
WORKS 142-44 (1973).
2 Examples of the new services included videotext, electronic mail, electronic fund
transfer, and value-added networks. SeeJ. E-irINGER, COMMUNICATION NETWORKS: PRIVATE
NETWORKS WrriN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ix-x, 225-50 (1985). Generally, these services em-
phasize digital data processing as opposed to the traditional service providers' emphasis
on voice transmission.
New service providers are often referred to as value-added network (VAN) suppliers
or enhanced service suppliers. For this Article, however, we prefer the term new service
providers. "Value-added services," "enhanced services" or, as we call them, "new serv-
ices," are services that "enhance" or "'add value to" the existing basic telecommunication
services (supplied by the traditional telecommunication service pr'oviders). See also R.
BRUCE, J. CUNARI & M. DIRECTOR, TiHE [EiLECOM MOSAIC, ASSEMBIING 'riE NEW INTERNA-
IONAL. STRUCTURE 41-182 (1988) (where the dichotomy in the regulatory approach to "ba-
sic" and "enhanced" services in a number of countries is compared).
'i A private network is a telecommtinication network using essentially the same tech-
nology as a public network, but which limits access to spefic customers or APecific kinds of
transmissions. Common carrier or public networks, in contrast, are intended to serve eve-
ryone. An example of a private network is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT), the network used by hanks all over the world to transfer
funds among themselves.
4 Analogue transmission is "Ithe use of one medium to directly represent a phe-
nomenon or activity occurring in another mediunl: e.g., the use of electromagnetic waves
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porting messages is gradually5 being replaced by fully integrated
digital techniques of transmission.6
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) traditionally
established the regulatory framework for international telecommuni-
cation services. 7 Keenly aware of this changing telecommunication
environment, the Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU stated in
1982 that "it is advisable to establish, to the extent necessary, a
[new] broad international regulatory framework for all existing and
foreseen new telecommunication services." 8
In drafting this new framework, one of the main controversies
has been whether the new providers of international telecommunica-
tion services should, just like the traditional Telecommunication Ad-
ministrations (TAs)9 and Recognized Private Operating Agencies
(RPOAs), I" fall within the regulatory scope of the ITU. I I The an-
swer to this question has been affirmative in most cases, not so much
to represent sound waves." j. GRAHAM, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF TELECOMMUNICA-
"riONS 14 (1983).
5 Although there is an increasing tendency to carry data traffic on high speed digital
circuits, the use o, for example, telephone circuits to carry data represented in analogue
form is still common. A modem is used to convert digital signals to and from the analogue
format.
6 Exchanges using Idigitall technology are said to be integrated because it is possi-
ble for them to handle all basic services (e.g., telephone, data, telex, videotext, and facsim-
ile) using the same exchanges and trunk network. J. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 86. The
digital transmission technique, in contrast with the analogue technique, does not directly
convert data into another medium, but produces "a signal at discrete voltage levels as a
series of pulses, for example at two levels, representing the I or 0 condition associated
with binary numbers." Id. at 54.
7 See infra note 16 and accompanying text (For a brief description of the ITU).
8 International Telecommunication Union Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, Res. No. 10,
- U.S.T. -, ".I.A.S. No. -,(enlered intofoirce, Jan. 1, 1984) reprinled in I G. WALLENSTEIN,
INTERNATIONAL 'EI.ECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENTS Part 3, at 238 (1986) [hereinafter ITU
Convention] (This statement was made in the context oF a call for a World Administrative
Telegraph and Telephone Conference, to be convened immediately after the CCfIT Ple-
nary Assembly in 1988, "to consider proposals for a new regulatory framework to cater for
the new situation in the field of new telecommunication services.").
) A Telecommunication Administration is "any governmental department or service
responsible For discharging the obligations undertaken in the International Telecommuni-
cation Convention and the Regulations." Id. Annex 2 (No. 2002).
ID A Private Operating Agency (POA) is '[any individual or company or corporation,
other than a governmental establishment or agency, which operates a telecommunication
installation intended for an international telecommunication service or capable of causing
harmful interference with such a service." Id. Annex 2 (No. 2008). A Recognized Private
Operating Agency (RPOA) is:
Any private operating agency. which operates a public correspon-
dence or broadcasting service and upon which the obligations provided for
in Article 44 ol the Convention are imposed by the Member in whose terri-
tory the head office of the agency is situated, or by the Member which has
authorized this operating agency to establish and operate a telecommunica-
tion service on its territory.
Id. Annex 2 (No. 2009).
i 1 See Nugent, An Overview of ilernalional Amses, in TELECOsMMUNICATIONS 1987: CUR-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICv AND REGULATION 151-52 (1987). The new service provid-
ers have not been automatically included within the ITU regulatory firamework because
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on theoretical or ideological grounds, but because of a general opin-
ion that it is very difficult to differentiate between types of telecom-
munication services in a satisfactory way. For example, when a new
service supplier provides a value-added service, it is hardly possible
to differentiate between the message transportation service-element,
which preempts the traditional telecommunication suppliers, and the
value-added service-element of the service.
The importance of definitions in determining the regulatory
scope of the ITU has been recognized by the International Institute
of Communications:
The role of definitions-of boundary lines between services and reg-
ulatory classification-is increasingly important in telecommunica-
tion law and regulation around the world. Demarcating the border
between "telecommunications" and "data processing" or "informa-
tion services," between "basic" and "enhanced" services, is critical
because these definitions stake out who may provide a service, and
under what terms and conditions. 12
We believe the supposed difficulty in drawing boundary lines be-
tween different telecommunication services can be overcome by con-
verting the criteria for telecommunications services trade developed
in European Community (EC) law to international telecommunica-
tion. Furthermore, we feel that the regulatory scope of the ITU
should be confined only to the network infrastructure'13 as a basic ser-
vice and to a limited number of specific telecommunication services:
telephone, telegraph, telex, and public switched data services.' 4 All
other services 5 should be tradeable in the free market without any
regulatory interference from the ITU.
The following sections of this article will explain our view. Sec-
tion II discusses the regulatory framework of the ITU and its current
approach to the new telecommunication environment. Section III
concentrates on the regulatory framework of telecommunication
this framework has been primarily aimed at the traditional telecommunication service sup-
pliers.
The new framework is necessary because, as a result of the growing convergence of
the different types of services and networks, a private network operator could start to offer
its spare capacity to third parties, using it to supply traditional services in competition with
the traditional service providers. Cf. Schnurr, Conduit-Content Convergence: Its Causes and
Effects, in I LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 157-73 (1988).
See also supra sections I & II.
12 Quoted in R. BRUCE, J. CUNARD & M. DIRECTOR, FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO
ELECTRONIC SERVICES: A GLOBAL SPECTRUM OF DEFINITIONS, BOUNDARY LINES, AND STRUC-
TURES 21 (1986). The dichotomy between basic and enhanced services has been ad-
dressed in the U.S. by the FCC in numerous decisions and regulations. See also R. BRUCE,
J. CUNARD & M. DIRECTOR, TIlE TELECOM MOSAIC, ASSEMBLING TIlE NEW INTERNATIONAL
STRUCTURE 43-55, 183-270 (1988).
I: The network infrastructure includes all the basic facilities needed to route trans-
missions to their destinations; essentially, the traditional facilities of the common carriers.
14 These are data services such as videotext which use the public data network to
transmit or channel to the appropriate destination.
15 See the new services referred to in supra note 2.
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services within the EC and the criteria this EC framework offers to
distinguish between different telecommunication services. Section
IV "translates" these criteria to the regulatory activities of the ITU
and its member States with a view toward examining whether such a
translation can be of any help in overcoming the momentous
problems in differentiating between various telecommunication serv-
ices. From this, a practical concept for regulating international tele-
communication is generated. In section V some concluding remarks
complete our conceptual framework.
II. The Regulatory Framework of the ITU
A. Purpose of the ITU
The ITU, founded in 1865, is an intergovernmental organiza-
tion which, since 1947, acts as a special agency of the United Na-
tions. Today, the ITU numbers 166 countries among its members.
Its major purposes are:
* "to maintain and extend international cooperation... for the
improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;"
* "to promote and to offer technical assistance to developing
countries in the field of telecommunications;"
* "to promote the development of technical facilities and their
most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of
telecommunications services, increasing their usefulness, and mak-
ing them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;"
* "to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of
those ends." ;
B. Legal and Organizational Framework
The ITU's legal and organizational framework is laid out in
three sets of documents: the Convention, the Administrative Regu-
lations, and the Recommendations. The applicability of these docu-
ments is limited to the ITU Member-States and to designated TAs
and RPOAs of the ITU Member-States.
The Convention specifies the internal organization of the ITU
and sets forth general principles governing telecommunication. The
Plenipotentiary Conference, 17 the supreme organ of the ITU, sup-
plements, deletes provisions, and enacts amendments to the Con-
vention at so-called Plenipotentiary Conferences.'
The Administrative Council coordinates the implementation of
14 ITU Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(l) (Nos. 13-16).
17 Id. art. 6 (No. 45); 1 G. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 8, Part 1, at 35-36 (1986).
18 Radiotelegraph conferences date back to the early part of the twentieth century.
Alter World War II, the first series of modern-day ITU conferences were held in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. I G. WALLENSTEIN, sulna note 8, Part I, at 49.
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the provisions of the Convention by ITU Member-States. The Pleni-
potentiary Conference elects members to the Administrative Coun-
cil. Both the Administrative Council 'and the Plenipotentiary
Conference are nonpermanent organs; the first assembles yearly, the
latter whenever it is judged appropriate.1t
The Administrative Regulations supplement the Convention 20
and are framed at World Administrative Conferences. These Con-
ferences discuss worldwide telecommunication issues and can revise
the Administrative Regulations partially or completely. 21 The Tele-
graph and Telephone Regulations are developed at the World Ad-
ministrative Telegraph and Telephone Conferences (WATTCs),22
and the Radio Regulations and the Appendices to the Radio Regula-
tions are developed at the World Administrative Radio Conferences
(WARCs). 23 Regional Administrative Conferences are also held to
decide specific regional telecommunications matters.2 4 The World
and Regional Administrative Conferences are nonpermanent organs
of the ITU.2 5 The Administrative Council manages the implementa-
tion of the Conferences' Administrative Regulations along with the
provisions of the Convention. 26
International Consultative Committees (ICCs) formulate the
Recommendations, the third set of documents. 27 The Recommen-
dations provide guidance on operational methods and techniques
11) Officially, the ITU Convention prescribes that a Plenipotentiary Conference shall
be convened every fifth year. ITU Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(l) (No. 34), Neverthe-
less, none in the last 37 years have been held within five years of each other. The dates of
these Plenipotentiary Conferences are Buenos Aires (1952), Geneva (1959), Montreux
(1965), Malaga-Torremolinos (1973), Nairobi (1982), and Nice (1989).
20 The Administrative Regulations "regulate the use of telecommunication and [are]
binding on all Members." Id. art. 42(l) (No. 170). The adoption of these regulations is
not done by the Plenipotentiary Conference, but by Conferences that "shall normally be
convened to consider specific telecommunication matters." Id. art. 7(2) (No. 51). [his
does not necessarily mean that these Regulations are more technical in nature; the Tele-
graph and Telephone Regulations, for example, contain a set of general principles,
whereas the Radio Regulations deal with highly detailed technical matters. In fact, the
present Telegraph and Telephone Regulations only incorporate abstract general provi-
sions relating to general operational issues. The CCITT Recommendations specify the
standards (technical rules) that are necessary to interconnect domestic telecommunication
networks of various countries. The present Radio Regulations, in contrast to the Tele-
graph and Telephone Regulations, contain very detailed technical provisions.
21 ITU Convention, supra note 8, art 7(3) (Nos. 53-55).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 [he agenda of a regional administrative conference may provide only for
specific telecommunication questions of a regional nature, including instruc-
tions to the International Frequency Registration Board regarding its activi-
ties in respect of the region concerned . . . IThe decisions of such a
conference must in all circumstances be in conformity with the provisions of
the Administrative Regulations.
Id. art. 7(3)(2) (No. 56).
25 See id. art. 5 (Nos. 25-33).
26 Id. art. 8(4)(1) (No. 61).
27 Id. arts. 11 (1),(2) (Nos. 83 & 84), 58(2)(1) (No. 326) & 75(l),(2) (Nos. 442 & 443).
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(so-called "standards") to be used for the provision of international
telecommunication services. 28 Unlike the above-mentioned ITU or-
gans, the ICCs are permanent organs.
One of these ICCs is the Comit6 Consultatif International de
T616phonie et de T616graphie or International Telephone and Tele-
graph Consultative Committee (CCITT). It is the organ within the
ITU that is primarily responsible for the regulation of the interna-
tional telecommunication network. At the Nairobi Plenipotentiary,
held in 1982, the task of the CCITT was formulated as follows:
The duties of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT) shall be to study and issue recommenda-
tions on technical, operating and tariff questions relating to
telecommunication services, other than technical or operating ques-
tions relating specifically to radiocommunication which ... come
within the purview of the CCIR. 29t
The highest organ of the CCITT is the Plenary Assembly, which
convenes every four years. 30 At this Assembly a list of technical sub-
jects relating to telecommunication is drawn up. These so-called
"questions" are subsequently studied by the respective CCITT
"Study Groups,"' which are composed of experts from different
countries. When a Study Group reaches consensus on a certain
question, a recommendation is formulated and submitted to the next
Plenary Assembly for final approval.3 2 The Plenary Assembly can
either send the recommendations for approval to their parent Ad-
ministrative Conference3 3 or address the Recommendations to the
Secretary-General as proposals for incorporation into the Adminis-
28 I G. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 8, Part 1, at 38.
21) I-U Convention, supra note 8, art. 11 (1),(2) (Nos. 83 & 84). The CCIR (Comit6
Consultative International de Radio, or International Radio Consultative Commintee), op-
erates in a similar fashion to the CCITT in radio and radio-frequency matters.
In fact, the present Telegraph and Telephone Regulations only incorporate general
provisions, and the CCITT Recommendations only specify operational rules that are nec-
essary to interconnect domestic telecommunication networks of various cotntries.
:io See ITU Convention, supra note 8, art. 58(l)(a) (No. 321).
3t Id. arts. 58(l) (No. 322), 58(2) (Nos. 326 & 327) & 69 (Nos. 403-406, 408).
:2 The texts of the Recommendations are published by the ITU Secretariat in the
CCITF Red Books.
3"1 "The Plenary Assemblies of the ICCs are authorized to: submit to Administrative
Conferences proposals arising directly from iheir recommendations or fiom findings on
questions under their study." ITU Convention, supra note 8, art. 75(1) (No. 442). A ques-
tion is whether the recommendations of the ICCs form part of the treaty instruments of
the ITU or not. Alfons Noll made the following submission on this subject:
Without participating directly in the legislative activities themselves of
the ITU's treaty conferences, they nevertheless, in one way or another, con-
tribute to, and are closely associated with, the preparation, the performance
and the implementation of the work of these conferences, as stipulated in the
various relevant provisions of the Convention.
Noll, The Insitutlional Framework of the ITt" and Its I'arious ,Ipproaches With Regard to Interna-
tional Telecoomounication Laow and Trealy Conferences, in Speakers' Papers, Special Session,
World Telecommunication Forum 19, 36 (Apr. 18-19, 1985) [hereinafter Speakers' Pa-
pers]. "It has ... to be concluded that these relevant Recommendations of the CCI's [the
French acronym for ICCsJ, as being referred to in the provisions of the respective Admin-
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
trative Regulations of the ITU. 34
Participation in the work of the CCITT is open to the TAs and
the RPOAs of the ITU Member-States. International organizations,
regional telecommunication organizations, and scientific or indus-
trial organizations which are engaged in telecommunication may also
participate, but only in an advisory capacity. 35 The organizational
framework of the ITU is summarized graphically as follows:
Structure of the ITU
C. Proposals for a New Framework
1. Introduction
As previously mentioned," at its 1982 Nairobi Plenipotentiary
Conference, the ITU agreed to establish a new international regula-
tory framework for all telecommunication services. R.E. Butler, the
Secretary-General of the ITU, stated that the objective is "to draw up
and approve, at government level, a basic framework of international
telecommunications regulations applicable in the 1990s and the
early part of the next century."3 7
istrative Regulations, can also be considered as fornling part of the latter as treaty instru-
nients." Id. at 26.
34 ITU Convention, supra note 8, art. 75(2),(3) (Nos. 443-444).
35 Id. art. 68(3)(1),(4)(1) (Nos. 398 & 400).
:30 See supra note 8 and acconpanying text.
37 Butler, Search for a YVew Internalional Telecom Framework, II TRANSNAT'L DATA &
COMM. R'., Apr. 1988, at 16, 16.
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To that end, the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference planned a
WATTC to be held in Melbourne, December 1988, preceded by a
Plenary Assembly of the CCITT.3 18 At this WATTC the current Tele-
graph and Telephone Regulations were to be replaced by Interna-
tional Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs).3 9  A specially
established CCITT-Preparatory Committee (PC-WATTC) developed
the draft ITRs for discussion. 40
As already noted, 4 1 the scope and application of the current Tel-
egraph and Telephone Regulations and CCITT-Recommendations
are limited to the ITU Member-States and the designated TAs and
RPOAs of the Member-States. The essence of the problem can be
found in this limitation; international telecommunication services are
not exclusively provided by TAs and RPOAs. Other providers42 al-
ready have entered this market and will continue to do so either by
using the available public networks or by implementing new private
ones.43 Thus the main question to be answered at the 1988-WATTC
was whether these new providers of international telecommunication
services should also come under the regulatory umbrella of the
ITU's new ITRs. 44
2. Proposed Solutions
The draft ITR, developed by the PC-WATTC, takes the position
that all providers of international telecommunication services should
be bound by the Regulations and Recommendations of the ITU:
Article 1(7) Members shall endeavor to ensure that any entity, es-
tablished in their territory, using the international telecommunica-
tion network to provide an international telecommunication service:
a) is so authorised by the Member,
b) complies with these Regulations, and
c) to the extent considered appropriate by the Member, complies
'38 ITU Convention, supra note 8, Res. No. 10. The Plenary Assembly was held No-
vember 14-25, 1988, in Melbourne, Australia. The Plenipotentiary Conference (WA-IT'C-
88) convened from November 28th through December 9th, 1988, also in Melbourne.
3'9! Id. Indeed substantive changes occurred. See infma text section II.C.3. ("Outcome
of the WAiTC-88").
40 The PC/WA-I-TC met intermittently from 1985 through 1987. At its fourth meet-
ing in Geneva, April 27th through May 1st, 1987, it adopted its final set of draft
regulations.
41 See snpra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
42 Some present examples are MCI International and Sprint, who provide services to
PTs of countries with which they have concluded agreements. An example of a special-
ized and value-added carrier, using leased circuits to provide database services, is
TELENET. Cf. Barnett, Botein & Noam, Law of International Telecominunication in the United
States, in 4 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 29-39 (1988).
See also supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
44 For a summary of the issues in this debate, see Nugent, HIlATTC-88: Global Harnioni-
zation, or Enirely New International Law?, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1987: CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN POLICY AND REGU.A'riON 149 (1987).
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with the relevant CCITT Recommendations.
4 5
Nevertheless, an overall agreement on this paragraph (and other re-
lated topics) was not reached before the start of the WATTC Confer-
ence. Article 1(7) is identified with efforts to support the position of
the TAs and RPOAs, while opponents to it argue that users and
other service providers will be adversely affected.
4
"
The Secretary General of the ITU organized an informal meet-
ing in April 1988 in Geneva, where he proposed an alternative draft
having no official status, but serving as an instrument for the ITU
Member-States to reconsider their positions taken with regard to the
official PC-WATTC Draft text. 4 7 The alternative draft suggested re-
placing Article 1(7) with a new provision, Article 9, which reads as
follows:
(1) Members may authorize their administrations, recognized pri-
vate operating agencies, and subject to terms and conditions appli-
cable under national law, any other organization or person, to enter
into special mutual arrangements with administrations, recognized
private operating agencies, or other organizations or persons so per-
mitted by national law in another country, for the establishment of
special networks, systems or applications, including the underlying
means of telecommunication transport, to meet their own interna-
tional communication needs or those of others who may use such
networks, systems or applications.
(2) In making special mutual arrangements between administra-
tions, recognized private operating agencies and other authorized
organizations or persons, the parties concerned should take into ac-
count the relevant provisions of C.C.I.T.T. Recommendations.
48
This "Article 9 Approach" reasons that a blanket application of
the ITR to new service providers cannot be justified. However, it
still brings all international service providers under the ITU um-
brella, but with a certain flexibility because these entities do not need
to comply with the CCITT-Recommendations, but only to take them
"into account."
The main arguments in favor of such an approach are that ap-
plying the full weight of the ITR is not in the interest of the emerg-
ing new markets for telecommunications services, 4 1 especially where
45 Draft-ITR, art. 1(7) (copy on file with the authors and the oltice of the NORTH
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
46 Nugent, supra note 44, at 154-55.
Chief among these Inegative] effects is the 17T diclation of a particular inter-
national telecommunications policy to all ITU members-a policy that relies
on rigid regulation . . . versus reliance on competition, flexible supervision,
and enlightened entrepreneurialism. [Thel Regulations will provide a shield
and a weapon for ITAsI inclined to subject emerging alternative providers of
innovative, network-based, value-added services to a whole panoply of regu-
latory requirements, review and inappropriate standardization.
id.
47 New 11A1'TTC Consultations, II TRANSNAT'L DATA & COMM. REP., May 1988, 5-6.
48 Draft-ITR, supra note 45, art. 9.
-) This flexibility would be essential in view of the diflerences in operation of
telecommunications from one country to another, not only in terms of serv-
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these new service providers are not necessarily involved in providing
services "generally available to the public." 5 0
A proposal 5' has also been made by the European Community
to retain a modified Article 1(7), limiting it to services generally
available to the public, and also to use Article 9, but omit its refer-
ence to the telecommunication infrastructure. This proposal is
called the "Article 1(7) Approach." Under this plan the ITR will
cover new service providers, including those with private networks,
in the same way it covers TAs and RPOAs, without the flexibility of-
fered by the Article 9 Approach. Subjecting service providers such
as banks or insurance companies to charging and accounting proce-
dures is not appropriate. 52 Those in favor of this approach, how-
ever, argue that since clear distinctions cannot be made, it is safer to
apply the ITR to all entities.53 Another important argument is that it
is not fair to subject the TAs and RPOAs, which are obliged to fulfill
public service objectives, to the ITR while other entities supplying
the same services are not subject to the ITR. 54
Both the Article 9 and the Article 1(7) approaches are inade-
quate because they do not draw the necessary lines of demarcation
between the different sorts of international telecommunication serv-
ices. Adherents of both views are aware of this problem, but do not
have proposals to overcome it.
3. The Outcome of WA TTC-88
The preliminary discussions before the start of WATTC-88
make it impossible to predict its outcome. No one knows which ap-
ices offered but also as regards the legal status of the bodies providing those
services and the difference in the resources available from one country to
another for the development of telecommunications, as a result of which the
range of services offered is not the same. These difficulties must be over-
come by Regulations displaying the "universality" required of any text which
is to be applied to fulfill the purposes of the Union as defined in the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Convention, in this case particularly to promote
harmonious development of services.
Negro, l1"4 TTC-88: Broad International Regulatorv Framework for Telecom munications Services in
the 90s, in Speakers' Papers, supra note 33, at 112-13.
50 See text accompanying supra note 16 (for a discussion of the purposes of the ITU
including the desire to make international telecommunications generally available to the
public).
51 Senior Officials Group Telecommunications (SOGT), On Common Action ofthe il1em-
ber States on Proposals for the Revision of the International Telecommnica/ions Regulations at the
ll'orldldinnistrative Telephone and Telegraph Conference (I.ITTC) 7, Communication from the
Commission, SOGT Doc. 88/106 (draft) (4 October 1988) [hereinafter On Common Iction].
52 The Banking and Insurance industries already have sufficiently sophisticated ac-
counting procedures to handle electronic funds transfer, and so on. Such a proposal was
pressed, however, early on in the PC/WVAFC's work. See Extacts fiom the Report of the
M11eeting of I'P 1115/ held in Geneva on 6 and 7 April 1987, PC/WATTC-Temporary Document
4-E, at 7-9; Report on the Weeting held in Geneva from 15 to 19 December 1986, CP/fT-R 3-E, at
9-1I (Preparatory Committee/WNATTC-88 Report R-3) (Feb. 1987).
53 On Common Action, supra note 51, at 7-8.
54 d.
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proach will prove to be the most persuasive. At the moment, it is still
too early to fully interpret the significance of the new ITR. We have
discerned, however, four issues as resolved by WATTC-88, and in-
corporated in the ITR, which, with some reservation, we believe to
be important.
First, the ITR distinguishes between the provision and opera-
tion of international telecommunication services offered to the pub-
lic and the underlying international telecommunication network
infrastructure.5 5 It defines "the public" as "the population, includ-
ing governmental and legal bodies."5
Second, the ITU restrains its regulatory scope when the pro-
vided services are not services generally available to the public, but
services established to meet specialized telecommunication needs. 57
ITU-Members can allow their TAs, RPOAs, or other entities to enter
into special mutual arrangements with other Members or any tele-
communication service provider, in order to "meet specialized inter-
national telecommunication needs within and/or between the
territories of the Members concerned, and including, as necessary,
those financial, technical, or operating conditions to be observed,"
under the condition that "technical harm to the operation of the tele-
communication facilities of third countries" 58 is avoided.
Third, new service providers as well as TAs and RPOAs are not
obliged to comply with the CCITT-Recommendations, but are asked
to conform to relevant CCITT-Recommendations to the "greatest
extent practicable. ' 59
Fourth, TAs, RPOAs, and new service providers are not limited
in the telecommunication services they may provide. They are only
limited by the national law of the Member-State.'!O
As a preliminary conclusion, the ITR agreed upon has turned
out to be a mixture of the discussions described in the foregoing
section II.C.2. It encompasses all international telecommunication
services, while recognizing that a distinction has to be made between
the provision of the network infrastructure, services generally avail-
55 International Telecommunication Regulations (ITR) arts. 1.1.1, 3 & 4, Final Acts
of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference (WAIFC-88) [herein-
after ITR] (copy on file with the authors and the office of the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
56 Id. art. 1.2.
57 Id. art. 9.1.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., id. arts. 3(4), 4(2), 4(3).
60 Cf. id. art. ](7)(a) (regarding "the right of any Member ... to require that [TAs,
RPOAs, and new service providers] .... which operate in its territory and provide an
international telecommunication service to the public, be authorized by that Member.").
Any telecommunication service may be provided by the traditional telecommunication ser-
vice providers and the new service providers, although depending on the national law of
the Member-State the latter may not be able to provide a reserved telecommunication
service.
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able to the public, and services that are established to meet special-
ized telecommunication needs. Clearly, the ITU is still dedicated to
the facilitation of interconnections between domestic telecommuni-
cation networks and does not seek to regulate trading practices of
telecommunication services providers. Nevertheless, no clear
boundary lines have been developed.
III. European Approach to International Telecommunication
Services 6
A. Introduction
The legal framework of telecommunication within the EC is de-
fined by the EC Treaty and the EC Court of Justice rulings on this
treaty. This section investigates whether they provide a possible
method to distinguish between the international telecommunication
services. 62
B. Exceptions to the Freedom to Provide Services
It is generally recognized that international telecommunication
services within the EC fall within the scope of Articles 59 through
248 of the EC Treaty,63 which refer to the freedom to provide serv-
(IO For this section liberal use has been made of the as-yet-unpublished paper of
Joachim Scherer, European Telecommunication Law: the Framework of the Treaty,
presented at the CELIM conference on Freedom of Data Flows and EEC Law, held April
2-3, 1987 in Brussels [hereinafter Scherer] (papers delivered at the conference will appear
in 2 COMPUTER/LAW SERIES OF KLUWER LAW AND TAXATION, to be published in 1989;
copies of Professor Scherer's paper are on file with the authors and the office of the NORTH
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAl. LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION). Instead of
making this section unreadable with footnotes, citations are provided only where
especially appropriate.
"2 Apart from this, it is worth mentioning that these rulings will regulate the imple-
mentation of the future ITR in the EC. This is because the ITR's application by the EC
Member-States is subject to Community law. The EC Member-States, therefore, have
made a reservation to the applicability of the ITR which subsumes their ITR obligations to
their EC Treaty obligations. This topic is beyond the scope of this article, however.
63 There is no doubt that tlse provision of telecommunications networks may
constitute a "service" within the meaning of Art. 59, 60. Whereas the provi-
sion of telecommunications networks within a Member State is not subject to
Art. 59 et seq. of the Treaty, the provision of telecommunications networks
which spread beyond the territory of one Member State fulfills all the re-
quirements of a "service" under Art. 59, 60: Establishing and operating the
telecommunications facilities-i.e. providing the hardware and the software
to fulfill at least certain transmission and switching functions-is neither an
activity covered by Art. 30 et seq. nor by Article 52 et seq. of the Treaty.
Consequently, Article 59 et seq. are applicable.
Scherer, supra note 61.
A telecommunications service is-according to an almost circular defini-
tion delivered by the CCIT"-'that which is offered by an administration or a
Recognized Private Operating Agency to its customers in order to satisfy a
specific telecommunication requirement.' This definition, vague as it may
be, suffices for purposes of the European law. Because telecommunications
services, which are offered via telecommunications networks, do not concern
the transportation or exchange of goods, they must be considered as 'serv-
ices' within the meaning of Art. 59, 60 of the Treaty.
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ices within the EC, irrespective of the nationality of the provider.64
The freedom to provide services can only be restricted by Articles
5565 and 56,66 the public interest exception, 67 and Article 90(2).68
These exceptions are worth closer study because they represent
the margin within which the EC Member-States can regulate the pro-
vision of international telecommunication services by national law
without having to take into account Community rules.
1. Articles 55 and 56
Articles 55 and 56 state that exceptions to the freedom to pro-
vide services are allowed when they concern "activities which in that
State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official
authority,"' 69 or when they concern "public policy" or "public
security."70
If a Member-State rightfully argues that the construction and
provision of telecommunication networks and services should be
treated as "activities which are connected with the exercise of official
authority," the basic rule7' of Article 59 will not apply, even if it frus-
trates the goal of creating a common (telecommunication) market.
The viability of such reasoning will be tested in the EC Court of
Justice, which employs a case-by-case approach when defining "the
exercise of official authority."' 72 It is to be expected that the on-go-
ld.
See also Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 833, 856, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8661, at 7817 (1980) (applying art. 59
to cable television services); S.A. Compagnie G~n&ale pour la Diffusion de la T6levision,
Coditel et al. v. S.A. Cin6 Vog. Films et al., 1980 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, 902-04
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8662, at 7843-44 (1980) (also
applying art. 59 to cable television services); H. SMIT, 2 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY 77-78 (Supp. 1984) (commenting on art. 59).
64 European Economic Community TreatyJan. 1, 1958, art. 59, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,40.
See P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 63, 213 (1987); Scherer, supra note 61.
65 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, art. 55, at 39.
66 Id. art. 56.
67 See i '/ra text at section III.B.2.
68 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, art. 90(2), at 50.
(11) Id. art. 55, at 39.
70 Id. art. 56(1).
71 Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
free supply of services within the Community shall be progressively abol-
ished in the course of the transitional period in respect of nationals of Mem-
ber States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of
the person to whom the services are supplied.
The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission, may extend the benefit of the provisions of this Chapter to
cover services supplied by nationals of any third country who are established
within the Community.
Id. art. 59, at 40-41.
72 Commission of the European Communities v. Belgium, 1980 Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3881, 3899-900, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8726, at
8751-53 (1980).
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ing separation of regulatory and operational functions within several
European Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) authorities will
clarify the scope of Article 55 further. 73
For the Article 56 exception to apply, a Member-State must
show that restrictions of the freedom to provide cross-border tele-
communication services are necessary in order to "prevent a clear
and present danger" to either public policy or public security.74
This will not frequently be the case.
The exceptions embodied in Articles 55 and 56, therefore, will
not apply very often. They do not represent a powerful threat to a
common EC approach to telecommunications services because these
articles leave little legal space for national authorities to implement
their own policies.
2. The Public Interest Exception
The public interest exception is a creation of the EC Court of
Justice. In its Procureur du Roi v. Debauve decision, 75 the Court stated
that the particular nature of certain services may justify having re-
strictions imposed upon (potential) service providers if and when
such restrictions are justified by the general interest, and applicable
on a nondiscriminatory basis to all persons and undertakings76 in the
Member-State concerned. 77 An additional condition, enunciated in
the earlier Ex parte Sacchi decision, is that the imposed restriction be
of a noneconomic nature. 78 Strictly argued, this condition goes
without saying, because otherwise the EC Treaty's explicit and over-
all commitment to the establishment of a common market would be
superceded.
Even though the Court has narrowed the public interest clause
to noneconomic goals, the provision of universal telecommunication
services arguably falls within the scope of the public interest excep-
tion. 79 Yet, as other cases have shown, for a restriction on the free-
dom to provide services to be justified, it must constitute the least
73 This will occur by defining the boundary line between "the exercise of official au-
thoritv" and activities which can not be categorized as such.
74 See P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 64, at 275.
75 Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 833, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8661, at 7813 (1980).
76 "Undertaking" is a generic term used for any organization of a predominantly
business nature. It is synonymous with the words "enterprise" and "company."
77 Debauve, 1980 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 856, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH), 8661, at 7828.
78 Ex Parte Sacchi, 1974 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 429, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8267, at 9173, 9185-3 (1974). Seealso European Community
Treaty, supra note 64, arts. 2, 3, 5 passim.
79 This argument can be made because the provision of, for example, telephone serv-
ices, is often seen as a public service, i.e., a service the government should take care of in
that it is provided to all people under the same conditions, without any access problems, at
the lowest possible rate.
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possible restrictive alternative, which shall be "objectively justi-
fied""" and not excessive in relation to the aim pursued.8 '
3. Article 90(2)
a. Introduction
Article 90(1) states that Member-States are not allowed to take
any special measures regarding public undertakings8 2 contradictory
to the aims set forth in the EC Treaty.8 3 Article 90(2) excepts certain
"public undertakings '8 4 from this general rule. The aim of this pro-
vision is to reconcile possible conflicts between Member-States' na-
tional public interest goals and the Community's goal of creating a
common market. 8 5 The provision states:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of a general
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade
must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the
interests of the Community.8
6
Some argue that because Article 222 allows a Member-State to
freely establish its own public sector (and thus public undertakings),
the competition rules, including Article 90(2) are not applicable to
public undertakings.8 7 Article 222 states that the EC Treaty is not to
"prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of prop-
80 Public Prosecutor v. Van Wesemael, 1979 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 35, 52, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 7646, at 7657 (1979).
81 Commission of the European Communities v. Germany, 1979 Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2555, 2564-67, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8601, at
7108-10 (1979); In re Alfred John Webb, 1981 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3305, 3324 [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at 7319, 7332 (1981).
82 A "public undertaking" is a corporation established to perform a public function,
frequently commercial but not necessarily so. It is normally a statutory corporation, i.e.,
established by Act of Parliament. Examples of "public goods or public services" provided
by public undertakings are gas and water services. For a discussion of public undertakings
under Article 90, see P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 64, at 271-73.
8 3 Member States shall, in respect of public enterprises and enterprises to
which they grant special or exclusive rights, neither enact nor maintain in
force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particu-
lar, to those rules provided for in Article 7 and in Articles 85 to 94 inclusive.
European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, art. 90(l), at 50. N.B.: the word
"enterprise" used in the above translation of the Treaty means "undertaking" or "com-
pany." See supra note 82.
84 "These exceptions apply to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services
of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly."
P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 64, at 272. "[Elven in cases where the
exception is applicable, the development of trade must in no circumstances be affected to
such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community." Id.
85 See E. MESTMXCKER, EUROP.ISCHES WE-rrBEWERBSREcHrr 653 (1974).
86 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, art. 90(2), at 50.
87 Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, 1985 Eur. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 873, 884, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at
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erty ownership."' 88 Network facilities are, of course, property and
thus their ownership should not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, it follows from the holding in Italian Republic v.
Commission of the European Communities (British Telecom) 8 9 that although
Article 222 refers to property positions, this reference does not
touch upon the applicability of the competition rules of Articles 85
through 90 as they refer to economic behavior, and not to prop-
erty.90 The Member-State is subject, inter alia, to the competition
rules of the EC Treaty. The allowance given in Article 90(1) for
Member-States to grant the exclusive right for the exploitation of a
network upon a "public undertaking" is therefore independent of
whether or not this undertaking is also the owner of the network.
Thus, the public undertaking, under this reasoning, is subject to the
competition rules of the EC Treaty.
Correlations, however, exist between property ownership under
Article 222 and economic behavior under Articles 85 through 90 of
the EC Treaty:
A Member State's "system of property ownership" has repercus-
sions upon the scope of permissible economic activities .... If a
Member State defines the extent, the elements, and the interface of
its national telecommunications network, these rules of (public)
property ownership may have repercussions upon the scope of per-
missible economic activities of telecommunications services provid-
ers. In sum, Art. 222 enables the Member States to determine-
within the limits of the evolving European fundamental right to
property ownership-the scope of permissible economic behaviour
and, consequently, the scope of Art. 90 of the Treaty.9
) l
Therefore, to judge the regulatory margin that Article 90(2)
leaves to Member-States, four questions must be answered.
(1) What are the criteria for considering a national telecommu-
nication network and service provider to be a "public undertaking"?
(2) What are the criteria for considering the provision of tele-
communication services to be "services of general economic
interest"?
(3) What are the criteria for considering an undertaking to be
"entrusted" with the operation of the telecommunication service?
16,017, 16,019 [hereinafter British Telecom] (argument made by the Italian Republic). See
also P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 64, at 227.
88 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, art. 222, at 88.
89) British Telecom, supra note 87, 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 873, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at 16,014 (1985).
90 The Court "observed that the schemes adopted by British Telecom are not
designed to suppress any private agencies which may be created in contravention of its
monopoly but seek solely to alter the conditions in which such agencies operate." Id.,
1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 873, 886, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,168, at 16,018 (1985).
9 1 Scherer, supra note 61.
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(4) When does the EC Treaty "obstruct" the operation of serv-
ices with a general economic interest?
b. Public Undertaking
For Articles 85 through 90 (the competition rules) to apply, the
entity that provides telecommunication services must be qualified as
an "undertaking. ' 9 2 For the exception of Article 90(2) to apply, the
"undertaking" must qualify as a "public undertaking." Many Mem-
ber-States deny that their national PTT can be interpreted as an "un-
dertaking" or even as a "public undertaking. ' 9 3 Two factors are
decisive in qualifying a government activity as a (public) undertaking:
(1) the existence of organizational or procedural ties to the
Member-State; and
(2) the qualification of the activities of the entity as activities of
an undertaking acting in the marketplace.
Article 90(1) of the EC Treaty, which allows a Member-State to
grant the exploitation of some telecommunication services to a pub-
lic undertaking, presupposes the existence of organizational or pro-
cedural ties between the government and the undertaking. These
ties can be of various kinds: contractual agreements, statutory ties,
state ownership, and so on. The current TAs and RPOAs can be
defined, respectively, as public undertakings and undertakings,
within the meaning of Article 90(l).94
Once procedural or organizational ties are identified, the activi-
ties of the entity must be examined to determine whether the entity
is an undertaking or part of government. In British Telecom 9 5 the EC
Court ofJustice implied that whether an entity has regulatory powers
is a necessary test, but is not sufficient to qualify an entity as part of
government. The Court found British Telecom's ability to issue reg-
ulations ("schemes") irrelevant, because these schemes did no more
than lay down tariffs and conditions for the services offered and were
determined by British Telecom itself without any parliamentary in-
terference. 9" The Court considered British Telecom's activities to
be of a business nature since they consisted of providing telecommu-
92 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 64, arts. 85-90, at 47-50.
'03 By making this denial, of course, such countries seek to circumvent the applicabil-
ity of the competition rules of the EC Treaty to government organizations.
94 See supra notes 9 & 10 for the definitions of TAs and RPOAs, and see supra note 83
for the wording of Article 90(1).
', British Telecom, supra note 87, 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 873, 885, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,168, at 16,018 (where the nationalized
industry is engaged in a business activity subject to Article 86 and its regulatory powers are
"'sth4ctly limited to laying down provisions relating to the scale of charges and other terms
and conditions under which it provides services for uses" (emphasis added) that industry
will be subject to the provisions of Article 86 in regard to rule-making activities).
96 Id., 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 873, 890, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at 16,018.
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nication services for a fee. 9 7 Reversing this reasoning, one may ar-
gue that a telecommunication entity, governed by regulations on
usage, is subject to parliamentary or governmental interference and
cannot be qualified as a public undertaking.
Nevertheless, in Radio Luxembourg9" the Court ruled that, in re-
gard to Article 86, the Treaty "must be interpreted as applying to an
undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market, even
where that position is due not to the activity of the undertaking itself but to the
fact that by reason of provisions laid down by law there can be no competi-
tion or only very limited competition on that market." 99 This judg-
ment indicates that legislative influence on a public undertaking does
not necessarily lead to the inapplicability of Articles 85 through 90.
Due to the dynamics of a democratic society, entities which fulfill
governmental tasks today as public undertakings may become (pri-
vate) undertakings tomorrow (and vice versa).' 0 0 Therefore, the
legal consequence of partially or wholly privatizing some of the tradi-
tional activities of TAs in Europe is that Articles 85 through 90 of the
EC Treaty are applicable to every organizationally or procedurally
separated telecommunication entity which provides telecommunica-
tion services.
c. Services of a General Economic Interest
When a national provider of telecommunication services is qual-
ified as a public undertaking and enjoys the exclusive right to pro-
vide a telecommunication network and the services based upon it,
the issue becomes whether such a provider is an undertaking en-
trusted with the operation of "services of a general economic inter-
est" within the meaning of Article 90(2).
In British Telecom the Court ruled that the Member-State that en-
trusted the undertaking with the question of services of a general
economic interest does not have the discretion to determine the ap-
97 Id. The court's ruling means, of course, that British Telecom is an undertaking.
1) Centre Beige d'Etudes de March6 T61 -marketing S.A. v. Compagnie Lux-
embourgeoise de T616diffusion S.A., 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3261, [1985-1986
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,246, at 16,458 (1985).
99 Id., 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3261, 3276, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,246, at 16,459 (emphasis added).
100 Due to the dynamics of a democratic society, societal perceptions of telecommuni-
cation services can change. Consequently, the regulatory framework of their tasks can
change also.
The analysis of these entities is further complicated by the mixed economy character
of most European countries, a situation which confounds the traditional dichotomy seen in
European legal doctrine between governmental tasks and activities of a business nature.
Cf. A. DERINGER, DAS WETTBEWERBSRECHT DER EUROPAiSCHEN WIRTSCIIAFTSGEMEIN-
SCHAF-r, KOMMENTAR ZU DEN EWG-WEFrrBEWRBSREGE1.N art. 90, 26 & 27 (1961); I.
PERNICE, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG art. 90, 11 (1983).
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plication of Article 90(2). 101 On the contrary, under Article 90(3) the
EC Commission, under the Court's supervision, exercises control
over the application of this article.10 2
The criteria for determining services to be of a general eco-
nomic interest are of both a substantive and procedural nature. 10 3
Substantively, the general economic interest is more important than
the specific economic interest of the undertaking concerned. Gen-
eral economic goals, therefore, "have to determine the en-
trepreneurial decisions; the undertaking's interest in profit-
maximization must be subordinated to the general economic inter-
est."'' 1 4 Procedurally, general economic interests are created by or
on the basis of legislative decisions. As stated in the Bayerische Verein-
sbank decision, 1 05 the legislators-more generally speaking, a mea-
sure adopted by public authorities-define and delineate the public
interest objectives of public undertakings.'10  Joachim Scherer has
stated the issue as follows:
Consequently, whether or not the provision of telecommunications
networks and services is a "service of general economic interest" de-
pends upon regulatory decisions of the Member States, subject to
Community law scrutiny. The Member-States will have to define and
redefine their "general economic interests" with respect to telecom-
munications networks and services. Arguably, the provision of a na-
tion-wide telecommunications network infrastructure which is linked
to international telecommunications facilities is a "service of general
economic interest." Whether or not the same applies to the provi-
sion of local networks and for the provision of telecommunications
services remains to be discussed.' (7
d. "Entrusted With"
As already mentioned, Article 90(2) requires that the undertak-
ing must be "entrusted with" the operation of the services in ques-
tion. The EC Court ruled that this provision requires a
governmental act by the competent authorities."l " Any dejure mo-
nopoly of a network provider must ultimately be based on a legisla-
tive enactment.
101 British Telecom, supra note 87, 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 873, 888, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at 16,019.
102 Id.
103 See E. MESTMCKER, EUROPAfSCHES WEITIrEWERBSRECIrr 662 (1974); H. Matthies,
in EWG-VERTRAG art. 30, 36 (1986); I. Pernice, in EWG-VERTRAG art. 90, 33 (1986).
104 Scherer, snpra note 61.
105 Z6hner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG, 1981 Eur. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2021, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8,706, at 8,434 (1981).
106 Id., 1981 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2030, 11979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8,706, at 8,439.
107 Scherer, supra note 61.
I08 Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SABAM, 1974 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313, 318,
[1974 Transfer Binderl Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8269, at 9185-43 (1974).
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e. Obstruction
The final test is whether the rules of the EC Treaty obstruct "the
performance ... of the particular tasks" assigned to a telecommuni-
cation provider.'0 9 The Court's decision in British Telecom implies
that the margin of this exception cannot be compared to the public
interest exception developed by the Court under Article 56.1 10 The
public interest exception applies only to public interest considera-
tions of a noneconomic nature.Ii Nevertheless, the British Telecom
court stated that the "performance ...of the particular tasks" as-
signed to a public undertaking can also be obstructed by economic
behavior.' 12
The particular task assigned to a telecommunication network
provider is the construction and operation of a telecommunication
network. Arguably, the performance of this particular task can be
obstructed if the providers' exclusive right to provide networks is
abolished. This obstruction may lead to "skimming of the cream" by
competing network providers and, ultimately, to an obstruction of
the provision of universal network services by rendering the provi-
sion of a nation-wide, modern telecommunication network impossi-
ble. The network provider in question, however, must clearly
demonstrate the danger that the provision of network services will be
obstructed.
The particular task assigned to a telecommunication service pro-
vider may consist of the provision of universal services, that is serv-
ices which are provided with general coverage of a given territory to
all users on approximately the same terms. Again, it is assumed that
the performance of this task may be obstructed if competing service
providers "skim the cream." The British Telecom 1'13 decision, as well
as previous rulings,' "4 show that the Court will scrutinize such asser-
109 See supra note 86 and accompanying text for the wording of Article 90(2).
I lo The Court favorably referred to the Commission's decision, which "noted that
British Telecom, as a statutory corporation, was an econoniic entity carrying on activities of an
economic nature and was, as such, an undertaking within the meaning of Article 86." Brit-
ish Telecom, supra note 87, 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 891-92, [1983-1985 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at 16,021 (emphasis added). See also
Scherer, snpra note 61.
1 I 1 See sepra note 78 and accompanying text.
112 British Telecom, supra note 87, 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 888, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168, at 16,019.
113 The Court stated that the Italian government "totally failed to demonstrate ...
unfavorable" economic effects to British Telecom by the Commission's decision to pro-
hibit British Telecom's curbs on competing service providers. Id. It must be kept in mind,
however, that British Teleroni arose in a very tnusual procedural setting. The Italian gov-
ernment, under Article 173 of the Treaty, brought an action for a declaration that a Com-
mission decision relating to a proceeding against British Telecom under Article 86 of the
Treaty was void. Id., 1985 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, 11983-1985 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,168, at 16,015. See also Scherer, supra note 61.
114 See Ministre Public of Luxembourg v. Muller, 1971 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723,
729-30, 11971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8140, at 7606 (1971);
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tions of obstruction very carefully.
C. EC Green Paper on Telecommunication Services
The EC Green Paper on telecommunication services provides
for a substantial opening of the telecommunication services mar-
ket.' 15 A number of reserved services' 1 6 that are considered essen-
tial to ensure current public service goals and objectives (at this
stage: telephone and telex services) are excluded. At the same time,
providers of international services have the right to cross the EC
Member-States' national borders.' 17
On the other hand, the EC proposes to continue exclusivity or
special rights for telecommunication administrations (public and pri-
vate carriers) to supply and operate the network infrastructure., 18
This proposal is a recognition of the telecommunication administra-
tions' central role in establishing future generations of infrastruc-
tures. An essential approach in the EC policy concerning the
opening up of the telecommunication market is the clear separation
of regulatory and operational functions of the telecommunications
administrations.' 19
The EC has been able to draw flexible boundaries between the
network infrastructure, reserved telecommunication services, and all
other telecommunication services. As a point of departure, all serv-
ices can be defined services within the meaning of Article 59 of the
EC Treaty. Under Article 90(2) both infrastructure and reserved
services, however, can be excepted from the EC Treaty provisions.
All other services are left to the market mechanism. The framework
we propose to regulate the international telecommunication service
market goes along these same lines. But, contrary to the EC Green
Paper, we believe that the reserved services should include not only
telephone and telex services, but also telegraph and public switched
data-network services, for reasons to be explained in the following
sections.
Belgische Radio en T616visie v. SABAM, 1974 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313, 318, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8269, at 9185-37 (1974); Ex Parte Sacchi,
1974 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 429-30, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8267, at 9173, 9185-3 to -4 (1974).
115 TOWARDS A DYNAMIC EUROPEAN ECONOMY, GREEN PAPER ON THE )EVELOPMENT OF
THE COMMON MARKET FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT (COM (87)
290 final) (1987) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
I1 Telephony and telex are traditional reserved services. Id. § 4.1.3, at 66.
117 Id. § 4.2.2, at 68-69.
1 Is Id. § 4.1.3, at 64-65; see id. Changes in Role of Telecommunications, at Figure 9.
1! 9 Id. § 4.3.2(3), at 73.
212 (VOL. 14
1989] INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 213
IV. Conceptual Framework to Regulate International
Telecommunication Services
A. Introduction
The EC telecommunication law, as described above, distin-
guishes between three categories of service providers and subjects
them to different rules:
(1) service providers who act as a public undertaking and are
not subject to the competition rules of the EC Treaty;
(2) service providers who act as a public undertaking and are
subject to the competition rules; and
(3) service providers who fall under the scope of Article 59 et
seq. without any restriction.
Along these same lines we want to distinguish between:
(1) TAs and RPOAs providing for the international network
infrastructure;
(2) TAs and RPOAs providing, as we call them, Reserved Tele-
communication Services (RTS)120 ; and
(3) TAs, RPOAs, and other service providers supplying all
Other Telecommunications Services (OTS).
In the following subsections we define and elaborate on these
distinctions.
B. Definitions
1. Network Infrastructure
The network infrastructure consists of the facilities necessary for
the instant relay and transport of the message, including the switch-
ing equipment necessary to connect any network user with any other
user and incorporate a clearly defined interface from which the net-
work operator' 2 ' has to accept the message.
2. Reserved Telecommunication Services
For a telecommunication service to be treated as a Reserved
Telecommunication Service:
12o The term Reserved Telecommunication Services was first used by the EC in its
Green Paper on Telecommunication Services. GREEN PAPER, supra note 115, § 4.1.3. at 66.
However, the Green Paper included only telephone and telex in its definition of the term.
We extend it to comprise also telegraph and public switched data network services. See
inra section IV.B.2.
121 A "network operator" is "[a] person or program responsible for controlling the
operation of all or part of a network." J. ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS, DATA
PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 342 (1984). A "network operator" is "an organi-
zation responsible for the operation of a network; e.g. a common carrier providing a ser-
vice to users by providing circuits and switching equipment to carry messages over a
network." J. GRAIIAM. supr note 4, at 112.
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(1) it has to be available to all users on a nondiscriminatory
basis within a given territory; and
(2) the provision of the RTS must be thought necessary for the
general economic interest of the concerned nation.
The RTS, using the above criteria, is limited to telegraph serv-
ices, voice-telephone services, telex services, and public switched
data-network services. The RTS, as defined here, corresponds to the
services generally available to the public, as distinguished by the
ITU.
3. Other Telecommunication Services
OTS are any other telecommunication services that can be sup-
plied over a telecommunication network infrastructure which are not
RTS. 122 An OTS corresponds with the ITU's telecommunication
service for special communication needs.
C. Providers of the Different Services
1. Providers of the Network Infrastructure
The operators of the network infrastructure should only be TAs
or RPOAs, which are obliged by domestic law to guarantee the ac-
cess of all users to the network infrastructure in a given territory on a
nondiscriminatory basis. This requirement is contradictory to the
outcome of WATTC-88, where all service providers are allowed to
provide whatever service they want.
Almost all countries limit the number of network facility provid-
ers. 3 Some of the reasons for this are the following:
* Economies of Scale. Having only one or a few entities who are
responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the
physical network is economically efficient.
* National Security. The government can more easily address
122 The term "OTS" is our own invention. For some examples of what we call OTSs
see the new services described supra in note 2. In the context of our interpretation of how
telecommunication services should be classified, all possible services, except the Network
Infrastructure and the RTS can be classified as being OTSs.
I23 Even in the United States, with its authorized separate network infrastructure prov-
iders, no real separate supply of network infrastructure facilities exist.
Within the past ten years, additional firms-inclding International Re-
lay, Telenet, Graphnet, and Consortium Communications International-
have entered the international record market. [In the U.S. there always has
been a separation between the telephone (voice) market and the
telex/telegraph (record) market - authors.] While these companies hold
authorizations to provide international service, they actually use other carri-
ers' facilities.
Barnett, Botein & Noam, Regldation ofConitmon Carriers, in LAw OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS IN TlE UNITED STATES (Law and Economics of International Telecommunica-
tions No. 4, 1988). International record carriers "provide overseas/international
telecommunications services, other than voice communications (e.g., teletypewriter, fac-
simile, and data)." J. ROSENBURG, supra note 121, at 258.
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one or a limited number of network operators than it can a great
many.
* General Interest. One or a limited number of network suppli-
ers makes it easier to guarantee the provision of a universal service
on a nondiscriminatory basis to all users.
Often, the operation of the network is considered to be a natural
monopoly. Nevertheless, what really counts, in our opinion, is that
the provision of a network infrastructure is a "service of a general
economic interest" as defined in Article 90(2) of the EC Treaty.
Therefore, the TAs and RPOAs that operate the network should be
treated equally, both at the national and international level, similar
to the public undertakings not subject to the competition rules of
Article 90(2) in EC law.
The ITU Member-States should have the regulatory power to
decide for themselves what entities shall be authorized to act as a
network operator, while the ITU continues to be the international
center where the necessary technical and operational requirements
of access to the international network infrastructure are framed in
cooperation with all Member-States.
2. Providers of the RTS
A limited number of TAs and RPOAs should be appointed to
provide RTS. Nevertheless, if a TA or RPOA is also the operator of
the network infrastructure, both functions should be legally
separated.
The EC public undertaking subject to the competition rules
should be used as an example. In order to prevent market domi-
nance and to control cross-subsidizing, ' 24 a limited form of competi-
tion between the providers of the RTS should be allowed.
Countries should limit the provision of RTS to TAs and RPOAs
because of the need to guarantee equal access to certain telecommu-
nication services to all people. Developing countries, many of whom
do not have an equally spread infrastructure, have the additional ad-
vantage of being able to finance the upgrading of the network more
easily out of the earnings derived from the provision of the RTS.
With this funding they can determine their own pace of
development.
The listing of RTS in section IV.B.2. in the text above is an ex-
haustive account given the technology of today. Nevertheless this
listing of limitations does not prevent countries from further limiting
the RTS when the criteria no longer apply to a certain RTS in their
124 Cross subsidizing occurs when profits from remunerative monopoly telecommuni-
cation traffic is used to subsidize below-cost tariffs on telecommunication services subject
to competitive entry. Cf. Snow, The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN-
TELSAT), in 2 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 30 (1987).
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country.'12 5 New services, to be developed in the future, should be
matched with these criteria to see whether they should be treated as
an RTS or not. National law should define the RTS in a given terri-
tory and the TA or RPOA which is allowed to provide these RTS.
3. Providers of Other Telecommunication Services
The providers of OTS do not have a public function, compara-
ble with the network infrastructure operator or the provider of RTS.
These services may be provided by any entity to any potential user
over the available network infrastructures. Access to the network in-
frastructure should only be limited for safety reasons or noncompli-
ance with basic standard interface provisions.
These types of service providers should be allowed to operate in
a free and competitive market, corresponding to the freedom to pro-
vide services as laid down in Articles 59 through 248 of the EC
Treaty. If any international regulation is necessary, the competent
authorities have to be found in the GATT, or in another bilateral or
multilateral trading agreement. The ITU, in our opinion, is not the
proper international forum.12 6
D. The Practical Implementation of the Framework
The conceptual framework as described in the above sections
needs to be implemented at both the national and international
level. 12 7
1. Domestic Level
In most countries one entity exists which constructs, owns, oper-
ates, and maintains both the network infrastructure and the RTS.
The same entity tries to control the access of the providers of OTS to
the telecommunication market.
The steps to take when implementing our framework domesti-
cally are simple:
(1) The operator of the network infrastructure has to be sepa-
125 This is possible, for example, when there are enough RTS-providers to provide a
certain RTS in a fully competitive market. In such circumstances it is also possible to
guarantee that the particular RTS will be available to the general public on a non-discrimi-
natory basis. See the criteria for an RTS in supra section IV.B.2.
120 As described above, one of the aims of the ITU is to make telecommunication
services generally available to the public. As we have demonstrated, only the Network
Infrastructure and an exhaustive list of RTSs can be said to fall under this regime. All
other services should be traded on a free and competitive market. If any disputes arise
regarding the tradeability of such OTSs the GATT could possibly be the competent au-
thority to settle them.
127 The conceptual framework, however, will also suffice if it is implemented only at
the domestic level, because the ITR framework provides sufficient flexibility to accommo-
date multilateral and bilateral arrangements between Member-States concerning the pro-
vision of specialized telecommunication services.
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rated from the provider of the RTS. As long as the functional sepa-
ration is legally assured, however, the operator and the provider do
not need to be separated into two independent bodies.
(2) The network operator and the provider of RTS shall be ap-
pointed by national law to be a TA or RPOA or both, according to
ITU-rules and to domestic legislation.
(3) The national legislator shall define which services shall be
regarded as an RTS. Governments should continually watch the de-
velopment of new services and review the already existing RTS and
OTS, to decide whether they continue to be defined as an RTS or an
OTS.
(4) OTS-providers shall be admitted to operate on the domestic
markets in a free and competitive way, while national law has to take
care that they comply with basic standard interface procedures as de-
fined within the ITU and domestic legislation.
2. International Level
The implementation of the framework at the international level
is also not too sweeping. First, the assignment of an entity with the
status of a TA or an RPOA is left to the domestic legislator. 12 8 This
assignment is in accordance with the preamble of the ITU stating
that it recognizes "the sovereign right of each country to regulate its
telecommunication." 121)
Second, the list of RTS has to be implemented in one of the
regulatory documents of the ITU framework. A CCITT Recommen-
dation would promote efficiency and prevent a politicization of the
list. The applicability of the list has to be reviewed periodically. The
Recommendation, as already mentioned, shall contain no more than
the following RTS: (1) telegraph services; (2) voice-telephone serv-
ices; (3) telex services; and (4) public switched data-network services.
The Recommendation also shall contain procedural measures to en-
able the implementation. This implementation can be achieved in
the following way: each country will have to declare to the so-au-
thorized ITU-organ (for example the CCITT or the General-Secreta-
riat), which telecommunication services out of the list it wants to be
regulated as an RTS and operated by a TA or RPOA. The ITU pub-
lishes all the declarations made to inform the other Member-States.
These declarations, in turn, can inform potential service suppliers
about which telecommunication services are reserved in which
country.
128 See ITU Convention, supra note 8, Annex 2, for the definitions of an TA and an
RPOA (at Nos. 2002 and 2009, respectively).
1210 Id. Preamble (No. I).
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V. Conclusion
In itself our conceptual framework does not present a revolu-
tionary approach, and it certainly should not be looked upon as such.
It, however, will facilitate the transition from the old analogue trans-
mission epoch to a fully integrated broadband telecommunication
network.
It will not be possible to have all countries implement a totally
integrated digital network at the same time. This implementation
will create legal (and other)' 3 0 difficulties. Therefore, a legal concept
that will satisfy the regulatory needs of this transitional period is
needed. We derived our concept from the EC Treaty and the EC
Court's rulings on the EC Treaty and our concept holds the key for a
satisfactory transition. How the international telecommunication en-
vironment will have to be regulated after this period can not yet be
foreseen.
When using the concepts derived from EC law, one must take
into account that the EC Treaty is a very powerful international legal
instrument with its allocation of supra-national powers to the organs
of the EC. Such supra-national powers will probably never be
handed to whatever international organization regulates the interna-
tional telecommunication environment. Nevertheless, the EC con-
cept proves to be very useful.
Our framework has the advantage that it does not demand a to-
tal redefinition at the national level of the current regulations nor
does it constitute a completely different approach at the interna-
tional level to ITU-provisions. Other advantages are that it:
(1) is purposive;
(2) technically-oriented instead of politically-oriented;
(3) principally aimed at domestic regulation;
(4) allows for an unrestricted market entrance of OTS providers;
(5) leaves the original raison d'etre of the ITU intact- the facilita-
tion of the interconnection of respective domestic networks;
(6) allows for a mechanism to judge if a telecommunication ser-
vice has to be treated as an RTS or as an OTS; and
(7) it lays the responsibility of providing the network infrastruc-
ture principally in the hands of a government-controlled entity.
The above elaborated concept will guarantee an easily accessible
telecommunication network infrastructure and as such make it possi-
ble to satisfy the social and economic needs of all potential users,
including the general public and the providers of RTS and OTS.
130 There could be other difficulties of a political or economic nature resulting from,
for example, the large differences in the technical growth and use of telecommunication
facilities between developing and industrialized countries.
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